[wpfleger96]

Follow-ups to the CLI's Buzz desktop credential support, for a person running the CLI with a desktop pairing.

• The "no credentials" error names the relay. It says which relay the CLI tried and which relays this CLI is paired for, and tells you to pass --relay. When a pairing exists for that relay but no running desktop accepts it, it says so instead.
• Default relay for a paired person. With no --relay, no BUZZ_RELAY_URL, no inherited agent credential and no explicit key, the CLI uses the one relay that a running desktop still accepts this CLI's pairing for, confirmed by describe on a same-user connection. Stored pairings alone never count. With zero or several such relays, the default stays http://localhost:3000. A desktop's refusal fails the command with its message. When another paired desktop's check fails (its same-user check times out or can't confirm the owner, or it stays rate limited), the command fails rather than pick a relay, even if one other relay was accepted, since that desktop may accept a relay of its own; a timeout or exhausted throttle fails with a retryable error. auth desktop unpair never runs discovery, and auth desktop pair never asks other desktops for their pairings, so one desktop's refusal can't block pairing another. Help text updated.
• buzz auth desktop list. Lists each pairing's instance, relays and pubkey, with accepted, not accepted (revoked or no longer bound), not running, unconfirmed, rate limited or refused (the last three with an error), using the same check as the default relay. Desktops are asked at once, without waiting out throttling. It never prints tokens, needs no relay, prints [] with no pairings, and --format compact drops the pubkey.
• Retryable same-user timeout. When a paired desktop's same-user check times out and nothing else serves, the command now fails with a retryable unavailable error (exit 2) instead of "no credentials" (exit 3).
• Regression tests for the NIP-42 AUTH event naming the relay with its trailing slash, for skipping a paired desktop whose user can't be confirmed, without sending it anything, and for relay selection never asking desktops for pairings with an explicit key, auth desktop pair or auth desktop unpair, or over an inherited agent relay.

[github-actions]

🔐 Codex Security Review

Note: This is an automated, security-focused review generated by Codex.
Use it as a supplement to human review; false positives are possible.

Scope

• Exact PR diff: 744f3946f6fe1ff7a649c132638d5af608900dbd...d9b63b2e3eda72fe1ea2fc4df5449096debdaef7
• Model: gpt-6.1-sol

💡 Click "edited" above to see earlier reviews for this PR.

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Review Summary

Overall Risk: NONE

No concrete security, correctness, or reliability regressions found in the authorized PR range.

Findings

No concrete security, correctness, or reliability findings were identified.

Notes

• Review used read-only source and history inspection. Builds and tests were not run, as requested.

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_{Generated by Codex Security Review |
Requested by: @wpfleger96 |
Workflow run}

[kalvinnchau]

🤖 Two P2 defects remain: agent recovery guidance can select the owner's identity, and an unrelated desktop refusal blocks targeted pairing. Please address these before approval.

[TheSentinel454]

🤖 One P1 and one test gap below.

[TheSentinel454]

🤖 LGTM at d9b63b2. Both comments addressed.