intercom-client v7.0.4 is compromised #518

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1. plafleur commented on Apr 30, 2026

   

   plafleur

   on Apr 30, 2026

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   It also looks like every non-default branch was also updated with malicious code
   

   For example: 46f2c48#diff-7d76d7533653c23b753fc7ce638cf64bdb5e419927d276af836d3a03fdf1745a

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2. jadoonf commented on Apr 30, 2026

   

   jadoonf

   on Apr 30, 2026

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   For any devs landing here trying to figure out what to do — sharing what we observed at runtime when intercom-client@7.0.4 runs inside an actions runner. This is the same TeamPCP / Mini Shai-Hulud loader that hit @bitwarden/cli@2026.4.0 (April 22) and the SAP @cap-js packages (April 29).

   The publish-side diff is one line. package.json for 7.0.4 vs clean 7.0.3 is identical except for one new key:

   "preinstall": "node setup.mjs"

   All other scripts, dependencies, and metadata are unchanged. Same publishing identity (GitHub Actions OIDC). The registry-side signal is just the new preinstall hook + the timing — static scanners that don't diff every release have nothing to flag.

   What executes on npm install:

   npm install intercom-client → sh → node → bun → sh → gcloud config config-helper
                                              └→ sh → az account get-access-token
                                              └→ pwsh → Az.Accounts
   

   Multi-cloud credential probing, then router_runtime.js exfiltration to zero.masscan.cloud (we observed 11 flows alongside credential-file access).

   Loader fingerprint matches the prior campaign:

   • setup.mjs SHA256: 4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34 (identical across SAP CAP packages)
   • __decodeScrambled cipher seed 0x3039 (same as Bitwarden CLI cluster 3 payload)
   • Russian-locale process.exit(0) guardrail

   If you ran npm install intercom-client (or any transitive dependency that resolved to it) since 2026-04-30 14:41 UTC, treat the host as compromised:

   1. Uninstall, clear npm cache, pin to 7.0.3 or earlier in your lockfile until Intercom ships a clean 7.0.5.
   2. Rotate every secret in scope of any CI runner that touched it — GitHub tokens, npm tokens, AWS / GCP / Azure credentials, SSH keys, environment variables.
   3. Search every GitHub org you control for repositories with the description "A Mini Shai-Hulud has Appeared" and for commits authored as claude@users.noreply.github.com in the last 24 hours.
   4. Sweep for .vscode/tasks.json (with runOn: folderOpen) and .claude/settings.json (with a SessionStart hook) — IDE persistence vector new in this campaign; opening an infected repo in VS Code or Claude Code re-detonates.

   Happy to share the full telemetry with the team or any affected org

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3. jadoonf commented on Apr 30, 2026

   

   jadoonf

   on Apr 30, 2026

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   here's the run profile for 7.0.4: https://app.garnet.ai/runs/25178182242?repo=jadoonf%2Fgarnet-incident-pipeline&job=install&profile=019ddf51-76f2-7838-a44e-fba8d05a2b8b
4. oisinhurley commented on Apr 30, 2026

   

   oisinhurley

   on Apr 30, 2026

   Last edited by GavinJoyce

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   The intercom engineering team is aware of the compromise. We are actively investigating and will share more information as it becomes available.

   Additional guidance is available on our status page.

   EDIT: updated link to status page

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