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OpenClaw: Gateway chat.send ACP-only provenance guard could be bypassed by client identity spoofing

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Mar 29, 2026 in openclaw/openclaw • Updated Apr 20, 2026

Package

npm openclaw (npm)

Affected versions

<= 2026.3.24

Patched versions

2026.3.28

Description

Summary

ACP-only provenance fields in chat.send were gated by self-declared client metadata from the WebSocket handshake rather than verified authorization state.

Impact

A normal authenticated operator client could spoof ACP identity labels and inject reserved provenance fields intended only for the ACP bridge.

Affected Component

src/gateway/server-methods/chat.ts, src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts

Fixed Versions

  • Affected: <= 2026.3.24
  • Patched: >= 2026.3.28
  • Latest stable 2026.3.28 contains the fix.

Fix

Fixed by commit 4b9542716c (Gateway: require verified scope for chat provenance).

References

@steipete steipete published to openclaw/openclaw Mar 29, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Mar 31, 2026
Reviewed Mar 31, 2026
Last updated Apr 20, 2026

Severity

High

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(27th percentile)

Weaknesses

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing

This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks. Learn more on MITRE.

Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision

The product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of an input, but the input can be modified by an untrusted actor in a way that bypasses the protection mechanism. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-41299

GHSA ID

GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f

Source code

Credits

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